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Abstract
The paper uses data from the Third Integrated Household Survey to examine
whether or not the poor pay more for maize in Malawi. Two approaches are adopted;
an indirect approach which is based on quantity discounting, and a direct approach
which is based the relationship between an expensiveness variable and household
consumption expenditure. The paper nds that the poor in rural and urban areas
pay more for maize. This evidence of a poverty penalty in the maize market is not
sensitive to method used. It is found that the poor pay more for maize irrespective
of when the maize is purchased. Thus, seasonality does not seem to be behind the
observed poverty penalty. The paper also nds that the poverty penalty varies with
seasonality.The poverty penalty is signicantly more pronounced in the postharvest
period when maize is in abundance; it is however reduced in the lean season.
Keywords: Poverty penalty; quantity discounting; Malawi
1 Introduction
In certain markets, the poor may face relatively higher costs when compared to the non-
poor. This is referred to as a poverty penalty (Mendoza, 2011). A number of studies (e.g.
Attanasio and Frayne, 2006; Beatty, 2010; Gibson and Kim, 2013) have found evidence
of a poverty penalty with respect to food. One of the reasons for this penalty is that
the poor do not enjoy quantity discounts due to the fact they may face greater liquidity
constraints, and as a result may buy food in small quantities leading to higher unit prices
(Rao, 2000; Beatty, 2010). The poor may thus face second degree price discrimination.
The most important food item in Malawi is maize, a staple food. Its signicance is best
captured by Smale (1995) who says "maize is life" in Malawi. Maize is also a staple food
in Southern Africa, however, as is shown in more detail in Section 2, Malawi has the
highest per capita consumption of maize in the region. Consequently, maize prices take
on a special political, social, and economic signicance.
Do the poor pay more for maize in Malawi even after netting out seasonal e¤ects?
Is there evidence of quantity discounts or nonlinear pricing in Malawi? Does the poverty
penalty vary across seasons or areas? This paper provides answers to these questions. To
Department of Economics, Chancellor College, University of Malawi, Box 280, Zomba, Malawi,
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the best of my knowledge, no study has looked at the possibility of a poverty penalty
with respect to maize in Malawi. In addition to closing this gap in knowledge, under-
standing whether the poor in Malawi pay more for maize has signicant distributional
and nutritional policy implications.
Regressive prices for a necessity may lead to undesirable distributional consequences
(Rao, 2000; Beatty, 2010). This is especially the case for food because according the
Engels Law, the poors food budget share is higher than the nonpoors, and therefore
the inequality worsening e¤ect of the poverty penalty may even be more pronounced in a
context where the majority are poor, and the diet is not diversied as is the case in Malawi.
In addition to the possible distributional consequences arising from the poor paying more
for maize, maize price movements could also have implications on food security, nutrition,
and micronutrient deciencies. Evidence that a poverty penalty exists in the maize market
would suggest that poor Malawians face a self-reinforcing triple tragedy, in that they are
poor, they pay more for maize, and as a result they face nutritional deciencies.
Nutritional deciencies -which may in part arise from a poverty penalty- in children
may lead to permanent e¤ects and to their having diminished health capital later in life
as adults. Alderman et al. (2006) nd that improvements in nutrition in pre-schoolers are
associated with increased height as a young adult, and the number of grades of schooling
completed. Case and Paxson (2006) argue that the relationship between early-life nutri-
tional deprivation and poor educational and socioeconomic outcomes works in two ways; a)
through impairments of cognitive ability due to early-life malnutrition that harms school
success and, subsequently, labor market outcomes, and, b) through early life malnutri-
tion which translates into poor child health which in turn reduces both school attendance
and attainment. This in turn worsens adult socioeconomic outcomes. These negative
consequences of child malnutrition entail that e¤orts to reduce the poverty penalty with
respect to maize are vital for the social-economic development of Malawi.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the context
of maize consumption in Malawi. In Section 3 the methodology is presented, and the
variables used are discussed. This is followed by the empirical results in Section 4. Policy
implications of the results are discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Maize Consumption in Malawi
This section discusses trends, patterns, and the policy context of maize consumption in
Malawi. Maize is the main staple food in Malawi; it accounts for more than 60% of total
food production, 60% of energy, 48% of protein consumption, and more than two-thirds
of caloric availability. Besides, maize is also a source of micronutrients and vitamins: it is
a source for 67% of iron, 65% of zinc, and 56-72% of the less ramied B vitamins (Ecker
& Qaim, 2011). Figure 1 shows the evolution of per capita maize consumption for the
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period 1974-2009. It is evident that the steepest decrease in maize consumption happened
in the 1970s and early 1990s. Maize consumption was 165.3 kg/per person in 1974, and
declined to 139 kg/per person in 1994, before slowing down to 133.1 kg/per person in
2009. This declining trend suggests an increase in dietary diversity overtime.
Although maize consumption has been declining overtime, it is still very high com-
pared to neighbouring countries. Figure 2 shows the most recent (for 2009) maize con-
sumption patterns in selected Southern African countries. The gure shows that Malawi
is way ahead of her neighbours, with a per capita consumption of 133.1 kg/per person
in 2009. For instance, Malawis consumption is 2.5 times that of Mozambique, and 2.3
times that of Tanzania. Only Zimbabwe (110.4 kg/per person) and Zambia (110.2 kg/per
person) are the closest to Malawi. It can thus be concluded that food consumption is
less diversied in Malawi compared to neighbouring countries. As a result of this low
food diversication, national food security continues to be dened in terms of access to
maize. NSO (2012) found that 85% of households in Malawi cultivated maize (69% in
urban areas, and 88% in rural areas). Despite its importance as a staple crop, maize
productivity is low, and on-farm storage losses are high. This problem is further com-
pounded by liquidity constraints whereby households have cash needs, and may have no
other means by which to nance these expenses except to sell their maize (World Bank,
2007). Consequently, even those households that grow maize do not have enough to last
the entire year, and are therefore forced to purchase maize at some point during the year,
usually at higher prices.
The twin problems of low maize productivity and low food diversication are recog-
nized in the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS), an overarching medium
term national development framework. The MGDS has a number of strategies aimed at
solving the two problems over the period 2011-2016. Interestingly, despite acknowledging
the two problems, e¤orts to increase maize productivity have taken more prominence,
with little being done on dietary diversication. The most signicant productivity en-
hancing policy intervention in recent years has been the Farm Input Subsidy Program
(FISP), which provides low-cost fertilizer and improved maize seeds to poor smallholders.
Implementation of the FISP started in the 2005/6 cropping season, and in the 2012/13
nancial year, the programme represented 4.6% of GDP or 11.5% of the total national
budget (World Bank, 2013).
3 Empirical Strategy
There are two approaches in the literature which seeks to investigate whether or not poor
households pay more for food. The rst approach is an indirect one, and is based on
establishing the existence of quantity discounts (bulk discounts). If quantity discounts
are present, one then concludes that the poor more for food. This is premised on the
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possibility that due to liquidity constraints, the poor cannot accord to buy food items
in bulk. The second approach is a direct one; here one directly tests for a negative
relationship between the ratio of food prices to average food prices and income. These
two approaches can sometimes give contradictory evidence (Beatty, 2010). In this paper,
I adopt both approaches.
3.1 Indirect Approach
To test for quantity discounting or nonlinear pricing, I modify a modelling framework used
by Beatty (2010), which is an adaptation of earlier methods proposed by Rao (2000), and
generalized by Attanasio and Frayne (2006). Maize grain is milled into our, and this is the
most common form in which maize is consumed. A household either buys the our from
the market or buys maize grain from the market, and then pays to have it milled. In both
cases, the nal price paid by a household for maize therefore includes the cost of buying
the maize grain, and the cost of milling the grain. In order to examine possible rural-
urban di¤erences, the analysis is disaggregated by area of residence. Consider household
i 2 I in community (cluster) j 2 J which faces a maize price schedule pijg that depends
on quantity qijg; and a vector of other supply shifters W sijg as follows
ln pijg =  ln qijg + 
0W sijg + "
s
ijg (1)
where; g = rural; urban;  are coe¢ cients of supply shifters, and "sijg is a household-
specic idiosyncratic error term assumed to be uncorrelated across households, and un-
correlated with covariates.  is a quantity discount elasticity; if quantity discounting is
present, the elasticity has a negative sign. I use region dummies as supply shifters. More
details about these variables are presented in Table 3. The above specication su¤ers
from the so called unit value problem, which is that prices are generally considered unob-
servable in household expenditure data (Crawford et al., 2003; Dong and Kaiser, 2005).
What is observed instead are unit values which are calculated as expenditure on a food
item divided by quantity purchased. Following Deaton (1988, 1997), the unit values ijg
faced by a household can be decomposed as follows
ln ijg = ln pijg + lnmijg (2)
where mijg is a measure of quality. The absence of quality e¤ects (i.e. mijg = 1) implies
that unit values are equal to prices. Quality e¤ects might occur if higher observed unit
values are not reective of higher prices but rather the purchase of goods of higher quality
(Attanasio and Frayne, 2006). According to Deaton (1988, 1997), the demand for quality
depends on total household consumption expenditure xijg; and a vector of quality demand
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shifters W qijg as follows
ln ijg = 
0W qijg +  lnxijg + "
q
ijg (3)
where  is a vector of parameters for the quality demand shifters,  is an expenditure
elasticity of quality, and "qijg is a well behaved error term. I use sex, age, and schooling of
the household head as quality of demand shifters. Summary statistics of these variables
are provided in Table 3. Substituting the supply equation (1), and the demand for quality
equation (3) into the unit value identity (equation (2), and augmenting it with a vector
of seasonal dummies and community random e¤ects (random intercepts) ujg; gives the
price schedule in terms of unit values
ln ijg =  ln qijg +  lnxijg +
4X
l=2
lSijgl + 
0W sijg + 
0W qijg + ujg + "
s
ijg + "
q
ijg (4)
The inclusion of seasonal dummies is motivated by the fact that production of maize
is seasonal, and consequently maize prices are also seasonal. I control for this seasonality
by including four farming season dummies namely: Sijg1; March-April (harvesting sea-
son) as the excluded category; Sijg2; May-August (post-harvesting/ marketing season);
Sijg3;September-November (pre-planting season), and Sijg4; December-February (farming
and lean season).
Quantity purchased of a product is potentially endogenous. This endogeniety arises
from the fact that ln qijg could be quantity supplied or quantity demanded. In order to
identify the supply schedule, we need variables (i.e. exclusion restrictions) that a¤ect
quantity demanded but do not directly a¤ect the price schedule faced by a given house-
hold. Following Beatty (2010), I use the following household composition variables as
my instruments: log of total household size, share of members below the age of 5, share
of members between the ages of 5 and 17, the share of members above the age of 60.
Total household expenditure might also be endogenous due to measurement error. How-
ever, Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests of the endogeniety of quantity and expenditure showed
that only quantity is endogenous for both commodities1. The presence of endogeniety
can lead to inconsistent results, and in order to address this problem, I use error compo-
nents two stage least squares (EC2SLS) by Baltagi (1981). Preliminary estimations using
the Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) generalized two-stage least squares
(G2SLS) gave qualitatively similar results in terms of statistical signicance and signs
of the coe¢ cients. I however report EC2SLS results because they give better goodness
of t measures. The EC2SLS can easily be adapted to the two level mixed e¤ects model
that I am using in this paper, because it is similar to the standard panel data frame-
work for which it was intended. In the two level model, households vary within clusters
1I used ownership of a fridge and ownership of a bicycle by a household as instruments for the log of
total expenditure.
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(communities) while in a panel, time would vary across households.
To test whether quantity discounts on maize are di¤erent between periods of maize
shortages and periods of maize abundance, I allow  to depend on the seasonal dummy
variables as follows ijg =  +
P3
l=1 Sijgll: This leads to the following model with inter-
action variables
ln ijg =  ln qijg +  lnxijg +
4X
l=2
lSijgl +
4X
l=2
lSijgl ln qijgl (5)
+0W sijg + 
0W qijg + ujg + "
s
ijg + "
q
ijg
The signs and statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients l show whether quantity
discounts are seasonal. A priori one would expect quantity discounts to be more evi-
dent in a period when the supply of maize is in abundance and demand is low. Since
ln qijg is potentially endogenous as noted earlier, the interaction variables Sijgl ln qijg are
also potentially endogenous. I therefore use EC2SLS to estimate equation (5); where
the interaction variables are instrumented by the interactions of Sijg; and the household
composition variables.
3.2 Direct Approach
To directly check for evidence that the poor pay more for maize, I adapt an approach
developed by Aguiar and Hurst (2007). Their approach is based on a regression of an
expensiveness index on income, and other socio-demographic variables. Instead of gener-
ating a composite index of expensiveness as in Aguiar and Hurst (2007), I derive a variable
which captures the expensiveness of maize. The expensiveness variable shows how much
more or less than the average a household pays for maize. The expensiveness variable is
constructed as follows. I construct an area level (rural or urban) average unit value where
the average is weighted by total quantity purchased of maize in the area as follows
g =
X
i2I;g2G
ig

qijg
qg

(6)
where, qg =
P
i2I;g2G qig is the total quantity of maize purchased by all households in an
area g. The expensiveness of maize is then calculated as the ratio of the actual unit value
to the average unit value
~Eijg =
ijg
g
(7)
To ensure that the expensiveness variable is centered around one, I normalise it by
the average of the expensiveness variable in an area
Eijg =
~Eijg
Eg
(8)
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where Eg = 1G
P
i2I;g2G ~Eijg: The interpretation of the expensiveness variable is as follows:
values greater than one suggest that a household paid more than average for maize, and
values less than one imply that the household paid less than the average.
In order to test whether the poor pay more for maize, the following regression is then
estimated
lnEijg =  lnxijg + 
0Zijg +
4X
l=2
lSijgl +  jg + !ijg (9)
where,  and l are parameters, xijg and Sijgl are dened as before, Zijg is a vector of
socio-demographic characteristics of a household,  jg is a community random e¤ect, and
!ijg is a well-behaved error term. If the poor pay more for maize, then the elasticity
 will be negative. In order to test whether there is a relationship between the poor
paying more for maize and seasonality, model (9) is re-estimated with total household
expenditure-seasonal dummy interaction variables, Sijgl lnxijg.
3.3 Data and descriptives
The data used in the paper come from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3).
It is statistically designed to be representative at both national, district, urban and rural
levels. The survey was conducted by the National Statistical O¢ ce from March 2010 to
March 2011. The survey collected information from a sample of 12271 households; 2233
(representing 18.2%) are urban households, and 10038 (representing 81.8%) are rural
households. A total of 768 communities (clusters) were selected across the country. In
each district, a minimum of 24 communities were interviewed while in each community a
total of 16 households were interviewed. The survey also collected socio-economic and de-
mographic information on households, and household members such as sex, age, education,
and household ownership of assets. The IHS3 records information on food consumption
at the household level using the last seven days as the recall period. It collects data on
124 items, which are organized in eleven categories: cereals, grains and cereals products;
roots, tubers and plantains; nuts and pulses; vegetables; meat, sh and animal products;
fruits; cooked food from vendors; milk and milk products; sugar, fats and oil; beverages;
and spices and miscellaneous. Quantity unit codes, ranging from standard units such as
kilograms and litres to non- standard units such as heaps, pails, plates, cups and basins
are converted into grams by using conversion factors. After data cleaning, I end up with
3448 rural households, and 1646 urban households with complete information on maize
consumption.
Total quantity of maize consumed by a household is a sum of purchased maize, maize
from own production, and maize gifts. Table 1 shows the shares of the three components
of maize consumed by per capita consumption expenditure quintile, and area of residence.
There are notable di¤erences in the shares across all quintiles between rural and urban
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households; for rural households, maize from own production comprises the largest share
of maize consumed, while for urban households most of the maize consumed is purchased.
In both, areas, the shares of own produced and purchased maize are lowest for the poor-
est households and highest for the wealthiest households. In addition, for both rural and
urban households, maize received as gifts constitutes a tiny fraction of total maize con-
sumed; thus most of the maize is either from own production or from the market. Since
this paper seeks to investigate the existence of a poverty penalty with respect to maize,
I restrict the analysis to that maize component acquired through the market. Table 2
presents quintile-specic shares of household expenditure on maize in total food expendi-
ture for rural and urban households. Two things are noteworthy from the results: rst,
the share of expenditure on maize is highest for the poorest households, 53.9% for rural
households, and 34.5% for urban households, and the share is lowest for the wealthiest
households, 19.6% for rural households, and 10.3% for urban households. Second, across
all quintiles, the expenditure shares on maize for urban households are lower than those
for rural households.
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the variables used in the study. The results
indicate that the averages of the log of maize price per gram are -3.234 and -3.186 for
urban and rural households respectively. The corresponding standard deviations are 0.550
and 0.780 for urban and rural households respectively. These results imply that urban
households face higher, and more unstable maize prices than rural households. In terms
of quantity of maize purchased, the results show that urban households buy slightly less
maize per gram compared to their rural counterparts. This perhaps reects the fact that
rural households are on average larger than urban households; the log of household size
is 1.4 and 1.3 for rural and urban areas respectively. The averages of the log of the
expensiveness variable are -0.027 and -0.012 for urban and rural households respectively;
implying that in both areas, households pay less than the average price of maize in their
area. Besides, the results suggest that although urban and rural households pay below the
average price of maize, rural households compared to urban households pay more relative
to their area average prices.
4 Econometric results
4.1 Indirect Approach Results
Table 4 reports EC2SLS results on whether or not rural and urban households face quan-
tity discounting with respect to their purchase of maize. For each area, there are two
sets of results; one does not control for seasonality, and the other does. In addition to
controlling for the endogeniety of the quantity of maize purchased, the results control for
community level random e¤ects which capture community specic observed and unob-
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served factors which inuence maize prices. The results also include the sex, age, and
highest qualication of the household head, and regional dummies as controls. All inde-
pendent variables included in the di¤erent models are jointly signicant with Chi-square
values ranging from 668.93 to 1304.96. For rural and urban households, the quality elas-
ticities as captured by the coe¢ cient on the log of per capita expenditure are not only
statistically signicant but they are also quantitatively substantial. This means that for
both areas, there are signicant quality e¤ects, and that unit values of maize, and maize
prices do not coincide. The existence of signicant e¤ects also implies that if the quality
e¤ects had not been controlled for, the extent of quantity discounting would be underesti-
mated (Attanasio and Frayne, 2006). Interestingly, the results indicate that quality e¤ects
are larger in rural areas than in urban areas. Thus, even though the maize consumed by
rural and urban households is not homogenous in terms of quality, it is far less so in rural
areas.
Is there quantity discounting when it comes to maize purchases in Malawi? The
results in Table 4 answer this question. For each area, I rst focus on the results with-
out seasonal e¤ects. The quantity discount elasticities are all negative and statistically
signicant for both areas. Further to that, the results show that the quantity discount
elasticities are economically signicant. Specically, holding other things constant, a 1%
increase in quantity leads to a 0.342% and 0.581% reduction in unit values of maize faced
by rural and urban households respectively. These results suggest that regardless of lo-
cation, maize purchases in Malawi are subject to quantity or bulk discounting, in other
words, households that buy maize in large quantities enjoy lower prices. Interestingly, the
quantity discount elasticity for urban households is larger than that for rural households.
The di¤erence is 0.239, and it is statistically signicant with a t-statistic (p-value) of 9.92
(0.00). This means that relative to rural households, urban households benet more from
large purchases of maize.
Most of the maize consumed in Malawi is rainfed, and rainfall is unimodal in the sense
that there is only one rain season. Consequently, the production and availability of maize
reects this seasonal pattern, and this entails that maize prices are also seasonal. Are the
above results confounded by seasonal e¤ects? The next set of regression results in Table 4
control for seasonality by including seasonal dummies. For both areas, Wald test results
at the bottom of the table indicate that the seasonal dummies are statistically jointly
signicant, implying that seasonal e¤ects are present. Even after allowing for seasonal
e¤ects, the results indicate that quantity discounting in the purchase of maize exists
for both rural and urban households. Additionally, the inclusion of seasonal dummies
leaves the magnitudes of the quantity discount elasticities virtually unchanged. This is
interesting because it means that bulk purchases of maize induce lower prices regardless
of when the purchases were made. The presence of signicant quantity discounting in
maize purchases, together with the fact that the poor cannot a¤ord to buy maize in large
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quantities due to liquidity constraints, leads to the conclusion that the poor pay more for
maize. Thus, the poor in Malawi face a poverty penalty with respect to maize purchases
which is robust to the presence of seasonal e¤ects.
I now turn to an assessment of whether the poverty penalty depends on the season.
It is quite plausible to expect quantity discounting to be more pronounced in times when
maize is in abundance than during times of maize shortages. Table 5 shows results with
log of quantity-seasonal dummy interaction variables. The results conform to apriori ex-
pectations. For both rural and urban households, the magnitude and sign of quantity
discount elasticities depend on the season. There is a statistically and economically sig-
nicant negative interaction between quantity discounting and the postharvest season.
The quantity discount elasticities for rural and urban households in the postharvest sea-
son are -0.123 and -0.405 lower than those for the harvesting period (the base category).
This means that quantity discounting is more evident in times when maize is in excess
supply. The results also show that the discount elasticities are positive for rural and urban
households, implying that nonlinear pricing is less pronounced in the lean season when
there are maize shortages.
4.2 Direct Approach Results
The preceding indirect approach results have shown that rural and urban households face
a downward sloping price schedule when it comes to maize purchases. The inference
from this has been that the poor in Malawi face a poverty penalty in the maize market.
How robust is this nding to choice of method? Table 6 presents results of the direct
approach which regresses the log of the expensiveness variable on the log of consumption
expenditure, a measure of a households economic status. Like before, there are two sets
of results for each area; one with seasonal dummies, and one without. The results also
control for community level random e¤ects which capture community specic observed
and unobserved factors which inuence maize prices. I also control for the sex, age, and
highest qualication of the household head, log of total household size, share of household
members below the age of 5, share of household members between the ages of 5 and 17, the
share of household members above the age of 60, and regional xed e¤ects by including
regional dummies. The results indicate all the variables in the di¤erent models are jointly
signicant with Chi-square values varying from 80.27 to 196.66.
In summary, the direct approach results are consistent with the indirect approach
results. The coe¢ cients on the log of expenditure are all negative and statistically sig-
nicant for the rural and urban regressions. The results also show that the elasticities
of expensiveness with respect to consumption expenditure are also quantitatively large.
Holding other factors constant, a 1% increase in consumption expenditure for rural and
urban households respectively is associated with a 0.083% and 0.053% decrease in the price
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of maize relative to the cost of maize at area-specic average prices. Wald test results
at the bottom of the table indicate that in both areas, there are statistically signicant
seasonal e¤ects, and controlling for seasonality only marginally changes the magnitudes
of the elasticities but does change their signs. This implies that the negative relationship
between how much a household pays for maize, and household economic status is not
confounded by seasonal e¤ects. The direct evidence therefore suggests that poor rural
and urban households pay more for maize in Malawi. The observed rural-urban di¤erence
in the size of the elasticities further implies that poverty reduction e¤orts would have a
larger impact in reducing the poverty penalty in rural areas than in urban areas. Crucially,
these direct approach results together with the indirect approach results discussed earlier
mean that the nding that there is a poverty penalty when it comes to maize purchases
is insensitive to the method one uses.
I now turn to a re-examination of the relationship between the poverty penalty, and
seasonality using the direct approach. Table 7 contains results for the interaction between
log of expenditure and seasonal dummies. The pattern and nature of the interaction e¤ects
is qualitatively similar to the one observed under the indirect approach. The results show
that the poverty penalty is signicantly more pronounced in the postharvest period; the
coe¢ cients on the log of expenditure for the postharvest season are -0.173 and -0.096
for rural and urban households respectively. Besides, the interaction e¤ects for the lean
period are all positive and statistically signicant; suggesting that the poverty penalty is
diminished in the lean period.
5 Policy Discussion
The results in this paper indicate that the price schedule for maize is downward sloping,
and that poor rural and urban households pay more for maize in Malawi. These ndings
have useful policy relevance. First, the existence of signicant quantity discounting in
maize purchases means that the poor do not benet from quantity discounts because they
face greater liquidity constraints which make them buy maize in small quantities leading
to higher unit prices. Thus, policy interventions such as consumption loans, and group
buying schemes would enable the poor to relax their liquidity constraints, and capture
bulk discounts. Second, improving the functioning of maize markets would lead to a
double dividend of increased e¢ ciency and equity (Muller, 2002). These twin benets
arising from improved maize market performance may be due to the fact that as the
prices paid by the poor converge to the prices paid by everyone else, real inequality would
fall while at the same time resources would be more e¢ ciently allocated (Gibson and Kim,
2013).
Third, given the importance of maize in Malawi as shown earlier, the existence of
a poverty penalty in maize purchases has implications on the measurement of income
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inequality, poverty, and propoorness of growth. Income inequality maybe mismeasured
when a poverty penalty exists in the sense that real inequality and nominal inequality
may not coincide. In the presence of regressive maize prices, nominal income inequality
may underestimate the extent of income inequality. For instance, Rao (2000) nds that
food prices are income dependent in India, and that after adjustment for this e¤ect, the
Gini coe¢ cient for real income is from 12% to 23% higher than the Gini for nominal
income. Since o¢ cial inequality measures in Malawi do not control for the fact that
maize prices are income dependent, they may be underestimating the extent of income
inequality. Income dependent maize prices may also a¤ect the measurement of poverty.
The o¢ cial measurement of poverty in Malawi is based on a regional deation of household
consumption expenditures. As has been shown by Muller (2008), this kind of aggregated
deation which ignores the fact that prices vary across individual households, and locales
may lead to considerable di¤erences in measured poverty. This inaccurate deation of
living standards data in turn implies that poverty monitoring and anti-poverty targeting
can be badly a¤ected. The presence of a poverty penalty can also a¤ect the assessment of
whether economic growth has been propoor. Failure to account for regressive maize prices
may lead to biased conclusions. Günther and Grimm (2007) nd that ignoring ination
inequality in pro-poor growth measurements can severely bias assessments of pro-poor
growth.
Fourth, the results suggest that poor Malawians face a self-reinforcing triple tragedy,
in that they are poor, they pay more for maize relative to the nonpoor, and as a result
they face nutritional deciencies. This means that the poor may relative to the nonpoor
be facing nutritional deciencies because they face higher maize prices. Ecker and Qaim
(2011) nd that there is a negative relationship between maize prices and the consump-
tion of calories, protein, iron, zinc, and the low ramied B vitamins from maize, and a
positive relationship between maize prices and calcium, vitamin A, C, B12, and folate
consumption from maize. What this means is that maize consumer subsidies- a popular
policy intervention in Malawi- which seek to improve food and nutrition security can be a
double-edged sword; decreasing protein-energy malnutrition, while simultaneously wors-
ening the vitamin status of households. In terms of policy interventions, this means that
income-related policies which would free households from the poverty penalty through for
example the enjoyment of bulk discounts are better suited than price policies to improve
nutritional status.
Finally, and related to the above, the paper has shown that the poverty penalty is
more pronounced in times of abundant maize supply. This has important implications on
two factors namely; liquidity constraints and storage facilities. Due to binding liquidity
constraints and lack of storage facilities, or a combination of both, maize producers in
Malawi often sell cheaply a part of their production after harvesting - a time when maize
is in excess supply- but end up buying maize at higher prices during the lean season
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(World Bank, 2007). The non-poor owing to the fact that they are not liquidity con-
strained and/or they can a¤ord better storage for their maize, may purchase the maize
in bulk for consumption later. All this means that the poverty penalty exacerbates nu-
trition inequalities in Malawi; policy interventions to address this problem include the
promotion of improved storage facilities or the relaxation of liquidity constraints through
interventions pointed out earlier. The seasonal nature of the liquidity constraints further
suggests that the loosening of the constraints should vary directly with seasons to enable
households smoothen cash availability throughout the year.
6 Concluding Comments
The paper has used data from the Third Integrated Household Survey to examine whether
or not the poor pay more for maize in Malawi. Two approaches have been adopted; an
indirect approach which is based on quantity discounting, and a direct approach which
is based the relationship between an expensiveness variable and household consumption
expenditure. It has been found that the poor in rural and urban areas pay more for
maize. This evidence of a poverty penalty in the maize market is not sensitive to method
used. It has also been shown that the poor pay more for maize irrespective of when the
maize is purchased. Thus, seasonality does not seem to be behind the observed poverty
penalty. The paper has found that the poverty penalty varies with seasonality. The
poverty penalty is signicantly more pronounced in the postharvest period when maize is
in abundance; it is however reduced in the lean season.
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Figure 1: Per capita maize consumption for Malawi,1974-2009
Source: Author’s computation using FAOSTAT database
Figure 2: Per capita maize consumption for selected Southern African countries, 2009
Source: Author’s computation using FAOSTAT database
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Table 1: Quantity shares of maize consumed by source and quintile
Quintile/source rural urban
1
purchased 0.407 0.633
own production 0.551 0.306
gift 0.042 0.061
2
purchased 0.320 0.616
own production 0.640 0.355
gift 0.040 0.028
3
purchased 0.258 0.660
own production 0.709 0.313
gift 0.033 0.027
4
purchased 0.228 0.696
own production 0.729 0.270
gift 0.043 0.034
5
purchased 0.298 0.678
own production 0.644 0.282
gift 0.057 0.040
Total
purchased 0.305 0.672
own production 0.653 0.291
gift 0.042 0.037
Table 2: Share of expenditure on maize in total food expenditure by quintile
Quintile rural urban
1 0.539 0.345
2 0.432 0.255
3 0.360 0.197
4 0.294 0.153
5 0.196 0.103
Total 0.402 0.150
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of regressors
Variable Description Rural Urban
Mean SD Mean SD
log of price Unit of measurement: Malawi kwacha
per gram
-3.234 0.550 -3.186 0.780
log of quantity Unit of measurement: grams 9.226 0.536 9.131 0.825
age of head Years 40.460 15.244 36.834 11.944
male headed Dummy (1 if head is male, 0 otherwise) 0.753 0.431 0.830 0.376
none Dummy (1 if head has no education, 0
otherwise)
0.521 0.500 0.285 0.452
pslc Dummy (1 if head’s highest qualification
is pslc, 0 otherwise)
0.084 0.278 0.117 0.322
jce Dummy (1 if head’s highest qualification
is jce, 0 otherwise)
0.075 0.264 0.187 0.390
msce Dummy (1 if head’s highest qualification
is msce, 0 otherwise)
0.047 0.211 0.238 0.426
postsecondary Dummy (1 if head has a tertiary
qualification, 0 otherwise)
0.014 0.116 0.110 0.313
log of expenditure Log of per capita household expenditure 10.484 0.719 11.413 0.823
log of household
size
Log of household size 1.398 0.550 1.334 0.579
share under 5 Share in a household of members aged
below 5
0.041 0.067 0.026 0.055
share 5-17 Share in a household of members aged 5-
17
0.077 0.090 0.062 0.083
share above 60 Share in a household of members aged
above 60
0.008 0.045 0.003 0.026
owns a fridge Dummy (1 if household owns a fridge, 0
otherwise)
0.012 0.111 0.169 0.375
owns a bicycle Dummy (1 if household owns a bicycle,
0 otherwise)
0.359 0.480 0.251 0.434
season1=harvesting Dummy (1 if household was interviewed
in March-April, 0 otherwise)
0.222 0.416 0.199 0.399
season2=lean Dummy (1 if household was interviewed
in December-February, 0 otherwise)
0.147 0.354 0.198 0.399
season3=preplanting Dummy (1 if household was interviewed
in September-November, 0 otherwise)
0.276 0.447 0.303 0.460
season4=postharvest Dummy (1 if household was interviewed
May-August, 0 otherwise)
0.355 0.479 0.300 0.458
North Dummy (1 if household resides in the
northern region, 0 otherwise)
0.122 0.327 0.242 0.428
Centre Dummy (1 if household resides in the
central region, 0 otherwise)
0.224 0.417 0.309 0.462
South Dummy (1 if household resides in the
southern region, 0 otherwise)
0.654 0.476 0.449 0.498
log expensiveness
index
Log of the expensiveness index -0.012 0.186 -0.027 0.241
Observations 3448 1646
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Table 4: Indirect approach with and without seasonal e¤ects
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
log of quantity -0.342*** -0.341*** -0.581*** -0.581***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
log of expenditure 0.135*** 0.133*** 0.057*** 0.054***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
season2 -0.048 -0.066
(0.044) (0.063)
season3 -0.148*** -0.241***
(0.038) (0.059)
season4 -0.171*** -0.263***
(0.037) (0.060)
Constant -1.496*** -1.372*** 1.319*** 1.519***
(0.218) (0.220) (0.303) (0.302)
controls included yes yes yes yes
Chi2 (regression) 668.93 701.81 1215.34 1304.96
P-value of Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chi2 (significance of seasonal effects) 27.75 29.04
P-value of Chi2 0.00 0.00
Observations 3448 3448 1646 1646
Notes: season2= postharvest, season3=preplanting, season4= lean. Controls included are: sex, age, and highest
qualification of the household head, and regional dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant
at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
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Table 5: Indirect approach with quantity-seasonal interactions
Variable Rural Urban
log of quantity -0.320*** -0.405***
(0.034) (0.048)
log of expenditure 0.132*** 0.060***
(0.014) (0.020)
season2 1.077** 1.189**
(0.466) (0.541)
season3 0.322 2.354***
(0.419) (0.492)
season4 -0.527 0.775
(0.399) (0.540)
season2 x log of quantity -0.123** -0.138**
(0.050) (0.060)
season3 x log of quantity -0.051 -0.284***
(0.045) (0.054)
season4 x log of quantity 0.088*** 0.115*
(0.013) (0.059)
Constant -1.562*** -0.121
(0.350) (0.501)
controls included yes Yes
Chi2 718.10 1422.73
Observations 3448 1646
Notes: season2= postharvest, season3=preplanting, season4= lean. Controls included are: sex, age, and highest
qualification of the household head, and regional dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant
at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
20
Table 6: Direct approach with and without seasonal e¤ects
Variable Rural Rural Urban Urban
log of expenditure -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
season2 0.003 0.001
(0.016) (0.029)
season3 0.049*** 0.087***
(0.014) (0.027)
season4 0.063*** 0.102***
(0.014) (0.028)
Constant 0.557*** 0.515*** 0.517*** 0.443***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.099) (0.101)
controls included yes yes yes yes
Chi2 (regression) 164.51 196.66 80.27 111.37
P-value of Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chi2 (significance of seasonal effects) 25.19 29.62
P-value of Chi2 0.00 0.00
Observations 3448 3448 1646 1646
Notes: season2= postharvest, season3=preplanting, season4= lean. Controls included are: sex, age, and highest
qualification of the household head, log of total household size, share of members below the age of 5, share of
members between the ages of 5 and 17, the share of members above the age of 60, and regional dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
Table 7: Direct approach with per capita expenditure-seasonal interactions
Variable Rural Urban
log of expenditure -0.083*** -0.053***
(0.010) (0.016)
season2 -0.101 0.498*
(0.155) (0.261)
season3 -0.439*** 0.019
(0.137) (0.233)
season4 -0.318** -0.142
(0.133) (0.235)
season2 x log of expenditure -0.090*** -0.043*
(0.015) (0.023)
season3 x log of expenditure -0.016 0.006
(0.013) (0.020)
season4 x log of expenditure 0.036*** 0.081***
(0.013) (0.020)
Constant 0.794*** 0.439**
(0.105) (0.185)
controls included yes yes
Chi2 213.65 122.69
Observations 3448 1646
Notes: season2= postharvest, season3=preplanting, season4= lean. Controls included are: sex, age, and highest
qualification of the household head, log of total household size, share of members below the age of 5, share of
members between the ages of 5 and 17, the share of members above the age of 60, and regional dummies. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%; and, * at 10%.
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